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Abstract:  2014 marks the 25th birthday of the World Wide Web. We have 
seen some remarkable developments as part of the digital age revolution in the 
last quarter of a century. These have taken place concurrently with a motor age 
that is possibly past its prime. A number of major motor manufacturers have 
faced disappointing sales or financial crisis alongside several countries seeing a 
halt to the historic trend of growing car use. The co-existence of the motor age 
and the digital age prompts this paper to consider the hypothesis that society is 
undergoing a fundamental transition from a regime of automobility to some-
thing significantly different. The paper considers what has characterized the 
motor age and proceeds to examine the digital revolution and how this is 
changing people’s opportunity to access people, goods services and opportuni-
ties. The range of interactions between the motor age and the digital age are 
addressed, underlining the difficulty in establishing the net consequence of one 
for the other. The new debates concerning ‘peak car’ are considered in which 
the digital age is identified as potentially one key factor responsible for ob-
served changes in car use. The paper then focuses upon a socio-technical con-
ceptualization of society known as the Multi-Layer Perspective to examine its 
hypothesis. The hypothesis remains neither supported nor not supported. 
Transport’s future in the digital age is uncertain and the paper sets out some 
views on resulting policy considerations and research needs. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper contends that a fundamental transition is occurring in those societies which have hitherto 
embraced and centralized the motor car and which are now (also) embracing the digital age. It suggests 
that we are some years into a process of gradual yet significant change away from the car as a foreground 
innovation in human connectivity with its important symbolic as well as functional meaning. 
This change is taking us into a recast form of society brought about by the affordances of the digital 
age revolution in which the car is set to become a background, functionally supporting technology. It 
will be accompanied and overshadowed by a much greater richness in forms of being able to reach peo-
ple, goods, services and opportunities made possible by information and communications technologies 
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(ICTs). Car dependence will abate as the spatial and temporal configurations of social and economic par-
ticipation in society become more flexible. This will have major implications for our transport and land 
use systems. 
The paper draws together for the first time a number of different territories of examining change in 
order to build its case for fundamental transition occurring. The paper is a polemic and thus constitutes 
a contestable, even if plausible, proposition. It therefore also underlines a level of uncertainty, unprece-
dented in recent times, over the future of demand for travel. In the face of such uncertainty, there is a 
need for transport policymakers to move away from their predisposition of forecasting the future and 
responding to it. They should instead be persuaded of a virtue of uncertainty - namely an entitlement, if 
not imperative, to make choices intended to shape the future—both of transport and society. 
At the outset of the paper, it is important to stress the nature of change in society. Sometimes large 
scale changes are dramatic, brought about by the overthrow of a political regime, a natural disaster, an 
energy shock and so on. However, more commonly change in society arises from an accumulation of 
modest adaptations over time which individually may be imperceptible and yet which become cumula-
tively significant. It is only by looking back over time that we come to appreciate the significance of the 
change that has occurred. As individuals and thus as a society overall we evolve in tandem with, and as 
part of, the changes taking place. In this context, change can be “stealthy” as well as profound. As indi-
viduals we age. This is not something we notice day to day but it is with certainty that we grow older 
and only by reflecting on our youth do we then wonder where the time went and how the face in the 
mirror could be so different. The same can be said of our transport and land use systems. A bit more ca-
pacity here, a few more cars there, a new development approved, further parking needed, another set of 
traffic lights, a bit more time spent in congestion – all accumulating to transform our built environments 
and our behaviours. Change is a process, not an event; and in the context of this paper is a process that 
spans decades. 
The paper has, as its storyline, the following. From its early and faltering beginnings, the motor age 
came to define the very fabric of society (section 2). It provided an apparently liberating force not only 
for the few but for the many as a means to reach destinations in order to participate in economic and 
social activity. We are so conditioned by our existence in a car-based society that it has been difficult to 
conceive of things being fundamentally different. However, from its own early and faltering beginnings 
has come the growing force for change of the digital age (section 3). We have been provided with differ-
ent ways of undertaking activities in time and space as computer screens have come alongside our wind-
screens. As the motor age and digital age now exist concurrently, the unanswered question is whether the 
latter is fundamentally disrupting the former. There has tended to be a “bottom-up” attempt to answer 
this question by looking at the different ways specific ICT-enabled behaviors have affected travel (section 
4). What is unresolved, and perhaps insoluble, is how the many different behaviors and effects combine 
overall. The aggregate picture appears to have been one of traffic (and congestion) continuing to grow in 
the face of an advancing digital age. However, it has emerged that in the early years of the new millenni-
um car travel (especially per capita) has seen, in a number of countries, an interruption to its long-run 
trend of growth (section 5). This could suggest that the motor age is starting to see some destabilizing 
effects that may be (indirectly) attributable to the digital age. Something more profound may be happen-
ing than has been hitherto revealed or substantiated by the bottom-up approach referred to above. By 
bringing the elements of the storyline together, the hypothesis can then be articulated that we are in the 
midst of a regime transition that is seeing the motor age becoming overshadowed by the digital age (sec-
tion 6). As the transition proceeds, the new affordances of how, where and when we can connect with 
people, goods, services and opportunities will increasingly shape our social practices, land use patterns, 
our build environment and transport systems. This presents new challenges and opportunities for 
transport policymakers (section 7). 
While in some parts the paper draws upon insights from the UK, its thesis is applicable to many if 
not all developed economies and countries that have embraced the motor car and which are now em-
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bracing ICTs and the social and business practices they afford. Just as different countries transitioned 
into the motor age at different times and rates, so too is the hypothesized transition likely to vary inter-
nationally. 
Alongside the theme of change, the other binding theme within the paper is that of access or accessi-
bility. Drawing upon SEU (2003), accessibility concerns people being able to reach other people, goods, 
services and opportunities “at reasonable cost, in reasonable time and with reasonable ease” (SEU, 2003, 
1). It is about the connectivity that brings about social and economic participation in society. 
2 The motor age 
 
There are considerable writings that capture the history of how the motor car came to fundamentally 
shape our towns, cities and ways of life (e.g., Kulash 1996; Davison 2004; Norton 2011; Dudley 2014). 
We are all, to greater or lesser extents, children of the motor age which stretches back for a century. Soci-
eties in many countries have only ever known an existence in a world where the car was king—and yet 
even the early beginnings of the motor age were showing signs of its problematic symptoms (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: 1924 image from Morton (1934). This is the first white line to be laid down in a London street as an experiment in 
solving the traffic congestion problem, which at this time had become acute. 
 
The motor car arrived into a world which had, as one of its characteristics, the primacy of physical lo-
cation. Activities took place in specific places. Where you were was a strong signal of what you were do-
ing. Fundamentally, the motor car was a means of transcending distance to reach activity locations and 
one that could do so at greater speed than its horse-drawn predecessors. It enabled an individual a potent 
element of independence in terms of locations they could reach and the times they chose to do so. Such 
independence and the accessibility it afforded had great prospect for opportunity in economic and social 
terms. The liberating force of the motor car and its ensuing mass production began to make freedom and 
independence available to the many, not just the few. However, the opportunities for motor car owners 
were dictated in part by the infrastructure available for their vehicles to use. Society responded by ex-
panding that infrastructure and allowing it to permeate and dominate the landscapes of our towns and 
cities in pursuit of the prosperity that such mass mobility was providing. More and more people sought 
to take advantage of this age of the motor car and vehicles were cherished as prized possessions that  
embodied status and projected image. Transcending distance meant in turn that land use changes  
responded to the affordances of the motor car. Urban sprawl developed as attractive and affordable 
household locations were sought and new business models were developed such as out-of-town super-
stores for shopping. 
 




2.1 From independence to dependence 
 
A society was created over time that saw the original notions of independence turn into dependence 
(Goodwin 1995)—the car for many was no longer a luxury but a necessity for economic and social en-
gagement in society. People were then faced with tolerating the abundance of car ownership and car use 
in the form of parked cars dominating our streets and urban centers and moving cars struggling to make 
progress on over-crowded highways. The challenges of accommodating the motor car in our towns and 
cities were well recognized in the 1960s (Buchanan 1963). A move from desire to necessity has prompted 
notions in more recent years that our love affair with the car may be over. 
The motor age’s centrality for society, love affair or not, has been underlined by an important associa-
tion—the apparent coupling between economic growth and passenger transport growth. We needed to 
keep the traffic moving to prosper, or so it seemed (see Figure 2—the subsequent picture for the mid-
1990s onwards is returned to in section 6). The following UK example of changing policy position sug-
gests that there is a deeply held belief institutionally that the dominance of the car is here to stay. Free-
dom to drive has stood the test of time largely unscathed as an apparent human right. Policymakers must 
tread with care if they wish to challenge that freedom; and they fear the destabilizing effect for the econ-
omy of steps to curb rather than support car traffic. 
 
 
Figure 2: UK trends in transport activity and economic activity (Image taken from SACTRA (1999, 24)) 
The prospect that it was possible to build our way out of congestion and thereby continue to fuel 
economic prosperity has been compelling. The motor age in the UK perhaps saw its last great policy 
stand in this regard in 1989 when Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government published its Roads to 
Prosperity White Paper (DoT 1989) which was dubbed Britain's biggest road building program since 
the Romans. However, the program never happened. Evidence was mounting that aside from the chal-
lenges of affordability, ‘predict and provide’ was not the answer. A major report to the UK Government 
in 1994 (SACTRA 1994) concluded new road capacity not only changed the patterns of traffic but 
could generate some new traffic suggesting that road building could not keep pace with traffic growth. 
The next White Paper from a new Labour Government marked an apparent watershed for the motor age 
in 1998 in stating that “since new roads can lead to more traffic, adding to the problem not reducing it, 
all plausible options need to be considered before a new road is built” (DETR 1998, 57). The UK has 
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subsequently faced an era in which it has sought to “sweat the asset” in terms of its transport system: new 
technologies under the banner of “intelligent transport systems” have been turned to for improvements 
to traffic management; and demand management has been given serious attention in order to encourage 
use of alternatives to the car. 
However, the UK most recently, as it struggles to emerge from recession under a Conservative-led 
coalition Government, has begun embracing “innovations” such as active traffic management which in-
volves opening up the hard shoulder of motorways to running traffic at times of congestion (in effect 
providing more capacity). The Government’s latest road traffic forecasts show, for the “central projec-
tion,” a 43% growth in road traffic by 2040 allied to projected population growth and economic activity 
(DfT 2013). In its National Infrastructure Plan (HM Treasury 2013), the Government signals an appar-
ent resurrection of predict and provide thinking allied to a continued assumption of the primacy of the 
coupling between and economic activity and vehicular traffic. It sets out commitment to tackle conges-
tion and support economic growth by a level of investment in roads unmatched since the 1970s. 
One might say that “old habits die hard.” As Dudley (2014) highlights, society has, for some time 
now, faced a “triple interlocking” effect of the motor industry, public use of its products and infrastruc-
ture provision to support use. This continues to create strong forces for preserving car dependence, con-
currently with inertia in relation to any prospects for fundamental change. 
The debates of the motor age have become more complex as decarbonizing the transport system has 
joined decongesting the transport system as an economic imperative; and as public health has been in-
creasingly recognized for its links with our forms of mobility. Nevertheless, there has seemed little to 
shake the foundations of the motor age. We are given the promise that technology can tackle transport’s 
climate change credentials (HM Treasury, 2008) as well as automate our cars to improve safety and effi-
ciency. Far from being past its prime, the motor age—it would seem to some—is evolving. 
However, it has now been accompanied by the digital age, which undoubtedly constitutes a signifi-
cant new force of change in society—with potentially very important implications for transport. 
 
3 The digital age 
 
It is a challenging business contemplating the capabilities and consequences of an unfolding new age. 
Two popularized/paraphrased quotes that have become notable for being overtaken by events are as fol-
lows: “I think there is a world market for maybe five computers” (Thomas Watson, chairman of IBM 
1943); and “computers in the future may weigh no more than 1.5 tons” (Popular Mechanics, forecasting 
the relentless march of science 1949). There continue to be underestimations of how far ICTs may ad-
vance. For example, in the early 1990s Hepworth and Ducatel (1992) could see no prospects for an evo-
lution of online grocery shopping alongside in-store shopping based on the assessment at that time of 
technological possibility. Yet two decades on, online accounts for some 4% of grocery sales in the UK 
with online sales estimated at £4.8 billion in 2010, up over 900% since 2000 (Lyons 2002; IGD 2011). 
 
3.1 The digital revolution 
 
Personal experience matters in shaping our perspectives as researchers and commentators. My 1980s teen 
years included the arrival of early home computing – principally as an opportunity to play games and to 
write one’s own software to play games. My first computer, the Sinclair ZX81 (the UK’s first mass mar-
ket home computer), had 1000 bytes of memory—a far cry from the gigabytes and even terabytes (1012 
bytes) our home computers deal in today; and no notion of electronically networking with others. Leap-
ing forward, 2014 marks the 25th birthday of the World Wide Web. To refer to my own childhood ex-
perience is to note in turn how ‘stealthy’ change has accumulated in a dramatic fashion. Table 1 is a 
compilation of year-by-year developments over 17 years within the digital revolution starting with the 
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arrival of Google. This was 1997, the same year that Steven Levy (senior writer for emerging technolo-
gies magazine Wired) stated that “the world is poised on the cusp of an economic and cultural shift as 
dramatic as that of the Industrial Revolution” (“Random Access”, Newsweek, 17 July 1997). 
Such a compilation provides a stark reminder of how many elements of the digital revolution have 
penetrated and will penetrate the lives of many people across the world1 and yet elements which we have 
absorbed and perhaps taken for granted or become dependent upon. Pause and really try to recall a pre-
1997 world where to Google, Skype, eBay, Facebook and Tweet were not known verbs. It is not neces-
sarily that easy to do—even less so for those now reaching university age. We have moved into a world 
where we can search for and engage with almost anything online, whether information, other people, 
goods or services; and we can do so (if equipped) from (almost) anywhere and anytime—whether at our 
desks, on the move or in our living rooms. Many people live now in an “always on” world. We have 
moved from pens to keyboards; from keyboards to swiping fingers across screens; and are now at the 
point of voice-responsive headsets to interact with the digital world. An important question is how much 
more innovation and innovation diffusion (Rogers, 1962) is still to come? Are we reaching the limits of 
what a digitally connected world has to offer or does Table 1 merely reflect the early beginnings? 
  
                                                      
1 It is estimated (http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm) that over 2.4 billion people (over a third of the world’s popula-
tion) are now connected to the Internet. While this leaves the majority of people still not connected the same is not true in 
North America with 79% of its population connected and a figure of 63% for Europe. From 2000-2012 there has been a 
growth in overall Internet users of over 560%. 




Table 1: Chronology of digital age revolution developments 
Year Digital revolution development Present day observation 
1997 Search engine Google.com registered as domain 
name and personal information manager Mi-
crosoft Outlook first made available as part of 
Microsoft Officea 
Google now processes over 1 billion search requests every 
day; by 2010 it was estimated that the average 
knowledge worker received nearly 100 emails per daya 
1998 The first commercially available MP3 personal 
music player MPMan F10 was launchedb 
The Apple iPod (launched in 2001) has since become 
the best known brand of MP3 player with worldwide 
sales of 350 million by September 2012a 
1999 Peer-to-peer selling site eBay launched in UKa Now has 14 million active users (around one fifth of the 
UK population)c 
2000 The Nasdaq index of leading technology shares 
peaked before rapid decline – marked as the 
bursting of the Dot Com bubbled 
In 2013 the Nasdaq topped 4000 for the first time in 13 
years – still 20% below its 2000 peake 
2001 Collaboratively edited encyclopedia Wikipedia 
formally launcheda 
Now has over 30 million articles across 287 languagesa 
2002 Online peer-to-peer music sharing service  
Napster declared bankrupta 
Napster and later services credited for the demise of the 
‘album era’ in popular music – 2012 saw digital down-
load sales of music in the UK exceed sales on CD and 
record for the first timef 
2003 Voice and video over Internet (free to use) call-
ing service Skype foundeda 
663 million registered users at the end of 2010a and 
“Skype’s on-net (Skype to Skype) international traffic grew 
36 percent in 2013, to 214 billion minutes”g 
2004 Official launch of the UK Government’s door-
to-door journey planner Transport Directa 
By 2012 the service had handled over 110 million user 
sessionsh  
2005 Video sharing site YouTube launcheda Now has more than 800 million unique users a month 
and “[i]t is estimated that in 2007 YouTube consumed as 
much bandwidth as the entire Internet in 2000”a 
2006 Social networking site Facebook open to everyone 
aged 13 and over and microblogging service 
Twitter launcheda 
Facebook now has more than one billion active users and 
Twitter, by the end of 2012, had 200 million monthly 
active usersa 
2007 Apple’s first iPhone smartphone went on salea By 2012 over 250 million units solda 
2008 Online shop Apple App Store launched - selling 
3rd party applications  for the iPhonea 
By 2013, over 800,000 apps available with over 40 bil-
lion app downloadsa 
2009 International version of e-book reader Amazon 
Kindle launcheda 
Worldwide ebook sales set to outstrip their print equiva-
lents in 2014 – but with year on year ebook sales having 
fallen for the first timei 
2010 Apple’s iPad tablet computer launcheda By October 2013 170 million units soldj 
2011 Apple’s financial reserves briefly larger than those 
of the US governmenta 
In 2012 Apple was confirmed as the most valuable 
company of all timek 
2012 Fourth generation (4G) of mobile telecommuni-
cations technology launched in 11 UK citiesl 
“[E]xtra speed and capacity allows for high-quality stream-
ing of audio, video and other content while on the move” l 
2013 Wearable computer Google Glass with optical 
head-mounted display made available to testers 
and developersa 
Consumer launch set for later in 2014m 
Information sourced (as at 17/07/2014) from: 
ahttp://en.wikipedia.org/ 
b http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/03/10/ft_first_mp3_player/  
chttp://pages.ebay.co.uk/aboutebay/thecompany/companyoverview.html  
d http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8558257.stm  
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e http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/11/nasdaq-4000-now-and-then/  
f http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/music/article3431386.ece  
ghttp://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2014/01/15/skype-traffic-continues-to-thrive/  
h https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transport-direct-key-metrics-and-statistics  
Ihttp://www.publishingtechnology.com/2013/07/year-on-year-ebook-sales-fall-for-the-first-time-says-nielsen-research/  
jhttp://appleinsider.com/articles/13/10/23/apple-has-sold-170m-ipads-to-date-implying-sales-near-15m-in-sept-quarter 
k http://www.bbc.com/news/business-19325913  
l http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-20121025  
mhttp://www.idigitaltimes.com/articles/21720/20140131/google-glass-release-date-consumer-launch-2014.htm  
 
3.2 New affordances of access 
Another key question is whether the developments in Table 1 have been incidental to, or instrumental 
in, shaping changes in social and business practices over the 17-year period? The Table gives a strong 
sense that digital age advances are penetrating people’s lives – but how is this affecting people’s participa-
tion in society? To what extent are we accessing (reaching) people, goods, services and information 
online? For Great Britain2, the Office for National Statistics is tracking Internet use over time. Changes 
from 2007 to 2013 in the proportions of adults (aged 16+) engaging in online activities are shown in 
Table 2. This highlights the substantial (ongoing) growth in the use of the Internet for access. It also 
highlights that levels of online activity engagement vary across different elements of the adult population. 
Alongside the information shown in the Table, the same source (ONS 2013) reveals 1 in 5 people have 
bought food or groceries over the Internet and 43% have bought household goods. 72% of people in 
2013 reported having made some sort of purchase over the Internet, up from 53% in 2008. 53% of 
people had accessed the Internet using a mobile phone in 2013 compared to 24% in 2010. 
  
                                                      
2 Great Britain (GB) is made up of England, Wales, and Scotland. The United Kingdom (UK) is made up of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
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Table 2:  Percentage of people aged 16+ engaged in different online activities (including age band for which the highest propor-
tion for 2013 is identified) (ONS, 2013) 
Internet activity 2007 2013  2013  high     
(age group) 
Sending/receiving emails 57 75 89 (25-34) 
Finding information about goods and services 58 66 77 (25-44) 
Reading or downloading online news, newspapers or magazines 20 55 72 (25-34) 
Social networking, e.g., Facebook or Twitter - 53 93 (16-24) 
Using services related to travel or travel related accommodation 42 50 65 (25-34) 
Internet banking 30 50 76 (25-34) 
Seeking health related information 18 43 59 (25-34) 
Consulting wikis - 43 60 (16-24) 
Looking for information about education, training or course offers 25 31 62 (16-24) 
Downloading software (other than games software) 16 31 55 (16-24) 
Selling goods or services over the Internet 12 28 45 (25-34) 
Telephoning or making video calls over the Internet via a webcam 8 25 40 (16-24) 
Looking for a job or sending a job application 14 24 45 (16-24) 
Participating in professional networks - 15 23 (25-44) 
Posting opinions on civic or political issues - 10 15 (25-34) 
Doing an online course 4 9 18 (16-24) 
Taking part in online consultations or voting on civic or political issues - 7 10 (35-44) 
 
Homeworking has been a practice long associated with the possibilities of the digital revolution with 
the prospect that it might replace the daily commute and reduce peak-period congestion. For some, 
tracking its fortunes over time is a test of whether the digital age really is making an impact on the motor 
age. However, tracking is beset with differences of, and ambiguities associated with, definition across 
studies. The UK Labour Force Survey has included questions regarding homeworking on an annual basis 
which, since 1997, have captured finer details of definition. Felstead (2012) provides the most complete 
examination of available data over time and change from 1997 to 2010 is shown in Table 3. In terms of 
absolute numbers, homeworking remains a minority practice. However, its rapidly growing association 
with the digital age is apparent and the flexible use of the home as one of a number of places of work is 
increasing. In overview it might be suggested that stealthy but cumulative change is indeed occurring. 
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Table 3: Change in homeworking in the UK from 1997 to 2010 amongst people in paid employment (figures reproduced from 
Felstead (2012) and based on Labour Force Survey data) – percentages relate to total labour force 
 
Working practice 1997 2010 % increase    
in proportion  
of workforce 
Working mainly “In Own Home” 611,835 (2.4%) 819,525 (2.9%) 21 
Working mainly “In Different Places Using Home 
as Base” 
1,552,859 (6.2%) 2,394,552 (8.4%) 35 
Working at least one full day a week at or from 
home 
2,986,725 (11.3%) 4,384,360 (15.3%) 35 
Impossible to carry out work at or from home for at 
least 1 day a week without the use of a telephone 
and computer 
987,608 (3.7%) 2,573,822 (9.0%) 143 
Percentage whose part use of the home is depend-
ent on ICT 
33.1 58.7 - 
 
3.3 Generational differences 
Most established commentators within the territories covered by this paper would now be termed a “dig-
ital immigrant” —defined by Google3 as “a person born or brought up before the widespread use of digi-
tal technology.” While increasing longevity may see digital immigrants remain a substantial proportion 
of the population for some time, the future will belong to the digital natives—defined as “[persons] born 
or brought up during the age of digital technology and so familiar with computers and the Internet from 
an early age.” The footnote to the latter Google definition observes “the digital tools that are reshaping 
our economy make more sense to young digital natives than to members of older generations.” Ten years 
ago Prensky (2004, 2) observed of digital natives that “their online life is a whole lot bigger than just the 
Internet. This online life has become an entire strategy for how to live, survive and thrive in the 21st 
century, where cyberspace is a part of everyday life” (see also Prensky 2001). As noted earlier in this sec-
tion, lived experience matters. In any look to the future we should ensure “expert” insight from digital 
immigrants is coupled with ‘lived experience’ insight from digital natives. As Table 2 highlights, those 
who are, or are nearest in age to, digital natives are most commonly embracing the digital age in terms of 
the accessibility to a variety of activities that it provides. Perhaps more than coincidentally, digital natives 
are those also now associated with declining driving license acquisition and car use (see section 5). 
4 Interactions between the motor age and digital age 
 
The paper has thus far set out a portrayal of the motor age and its profound imprint on society and has 
in turn sought to depict the dramatic rise of the digital age. A fundamental common denominator be-
tween the technologies of the motor age and the digital age is that of access—being able to transcend 
distance to reach people, goods, services and opportunities: the key to economic activity and social par-
ticipation in society. One might have been forgiven for assuming that transport policymakers would thus 
                                                      
3 Definition returned from “digital immigrant definition” Google search 
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take a keen interest in what the digital age had to offer. Yet interest seems to have been limited at best. 
For example, in 2000 the UK Government encouragingly acknowledged in its Ten Year Plan for 
transport (DETR 2000) that “the likely effects of increasing Internet use on transport and work patterns 
are still uncertain, but potentially profound, and will need to be monitored closely.” Yet regrettably, 
there has been little subsequent evidence in the 14 years since of such monitoring—at least by UK 
transport policymakers. Nevertheless, the appetite in academic research to better understand how the 
motor age and digital age are interacting has been significant over a long period. 
A number of interactions have been identified with the early work of Pat Mokhtarian and Ilan Salo-
mon pioneering expositions of such interactions (Salomon 1986; Mokhtarian 1990). The different key 
interactions are set out below: 
1. Use of ICTs can substitute for travel—an activity is undertaken without the individual needing to 
make a trip (e.g., teleworking—Andreev et al. (2010)). 
2. Use of ICTs can stimulate travel—information flows encourage the identification of activities and 
encounters at remote locations that individuals then choose to travel to (this can sometimes be a 
second order effect of substitution—for example teleconferencing widening social contacts which 
leads to motivations to meet in person (Button and Maggi 1994)). 
3. Use of ICTs can supplement travel—increasing levels of access and social participation are experi-
enced without increasing levels of travel (i.e., telecommunications can substitute for an increase in 
travel (Kenyon et al. 2002; Kenyon et al. 2003)). 
4. Use of ICTs can redistribute travel—even if the amount of travel (measured in vehicle or passen-
ger miles travelled) does not change at the level of the individual or at the aggregate, when and be-
tween which locations travel takes place can be changed (with implications for levels of traffic flow 
and thus congestion (e.g., Lyons and Haddad (2008) in relation to part-day homeworking having 
the potential to displace in time when the daily commute to or from work takes place). 
5. Use of ICTs can improve the efficiency of travel—data and information flows can enhance the op-
eration and use of the transport system (commonly considered under the heading of ‘intelligent 
transport systems’). 
6. Use of ICTs can enrich travel—whereby opportunities to make worthwhile use of time while trav-
elling (multitasking—see Kenyon and Lyons (2007)) are enhanced, helping generate a “positive 
utility” (Mokhtarian and Salomon 2001; Lyons and Urry 2005). 
7. Use of ICTs can indirectly affect travel—technologies can enable or encourage changes to social 
practices and locational decisions over time that in turn influence the nature and extent of travel 
(e.g., Hubers and Lyons 2013). 
 
4.1 Establishing the net effect on travel 
 
There is a rich and growing body of literature that seeks to explore and understand these different inter-
actions—what was referred to in the paper’s introduction as a ‘bottom-up’ approach. From the motor 
age perspective, the great unknown is what the net consequence is of the interplay of so many interac-
tions across different people, locations, activities, times and scales. This problem is compounded by the 
ever changing nature of the digital age technologies and services. Mokhtarian has comprehensively exam-
ined the myriad of interactions (Mokhtarian 2003; 2009) spanning both conceptual and empirical in-
sights. She has set out her view (Mokhtarian 2003, 46) that “telecommunications is increasing in share 
with respect to the other modes [of communication— i.e., travel] but use of all modes is increasing in 
absolute terms.” However, she also notes the formidable challenges of developing an “empirically realiza-
ble model” not least because of the problems of common units of measurement for amounts of travel 
and of ICT use. Mokhtarian (2003) highlights the limitations of empirical evidence to be able to address 
causality between ICTs use and travel. Her examination of international evidence has led her to a con-
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clusion that (Mokhtarian 2003, 54) “We can say with confidence...that the empirical evidence for net 
complementarity [stimulation of travel] is substantial although not definitive, and the empirical evidence 
for net substitution appears to be virtually non-existent.” Her later work continues to probe the chal-
lenge of net consequences for the motor age of the digital age (Mokhtarian 2009), questioning why we 
face the paradox of travel and congestion increasing in the face of an advancing digital age that offers the 
opportunity of alternative means of access. 
A more recent review by Aguiléra et al. (2012, 664) notes that in terms of the question of whether 
ICTs stimulate or reduce travel demand, “[i]n spite of a large amount of empirical research, the answer is 
still fairly unclear.” They conclude, according with much of Mokhtarian’s thinking, that while the ques-
tion may be legitimate, seeking to address it directly is probably futile. They suggest a need to more 
strongly acknowledge the gradual changes to our lifestyles resulting from the digital age and a need to 
focus attention on “how mobile ICTs are transforming many aspects of our daily lives and especially how 
they are helping to reshape the temporal and spatial organization of everyday activities” (Aguiléra et al. 
2012, 667). 
In other words, we are dealing with a complex socio-technical system in terms of the nexus of the 
motor and digital ages and to seek out definitive “truths” about net change is simply not possible. While 
Mokhtarian’s paradox may have prevailed until recently, new empirical signals of a puzzling nature have 
arisen concerning the motor age: in a number of countries it seems the inexorable growth in car traffic 
has stopped, at least temporarily. This phenomenon has been labeled “peak car.” 
5 Peak car 
 
In 2012 Goodwin observed that “[i]n many advanced economies, car use per head, and sometimes total 
car traffic, has shown low growth. In some countries (and especially cities) it has declined” (Goodwin 
2012, 4). This observation is not simply a reflection of the global economic recession—it refers to pre-
recession years concerning the new millennium. Goodwin is commonly credited with labeling this phe-
nomenon “peak car.” However the label can infer a determination of what is happening and what will be 
happening in future in terms of the motor age. This is not the intention and Goodwin (2012) summa-
rizes (at least) three hypotheses for observed trends in recent data on car travel, which he labels “uninter-
rupted growth” (i.e., present figures reflect a blip in an otherwise upward growth trend); “saturation” 
(i.e.,  demand is at a plateau such that levels of car traffic have become more or less stable); and “peak 
car” (i.e., car use per head is peaking or has peaked and in turn is in decline (only countered at the aggre-
gate by population growth)). These remain hypotheses because testing them rests upon post-recession 
data points running into the future. 
 
5.1 Multiple factors at work 
Two significant source of further insight into the phenomenon (and more sources continue to emerge, 
e.g., Lyons and Goodwin (2014)) are the special issue of Transport Reviews edited by Goodwin and 
Stokes (2013) which is devoted to peak car; and an analysis of national travel survey data for Great Brit-
ain for the period between 1995 and 2007 (Le Vine and Jones 2012). Both sources offer a richness of 
insight into the phenomenon which in sum highlights a series of (possible) contributory factors at work 
but also that “no single straightforward explanation” (LeVine and Jones 2012, xi) is apparent and “the 
driving factors for car use interact in a complex way” (Goodwin and Van Dender 2013, 252). Aggregate 
trends in travel mask significant underlying variations whereby both increases and decreases in car use 
can be observed. 
Levels of per capita car use are found to be lower in dense urban areas than rural areas. In examining 
the peak car phenomenon in the UK, Headicar (2013) observes the increase in the last decade of the 
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share of the total population living in more urbanized areas and in turn indicates that this has contribut-
ed to the observed overall reduction in per capita car use. Le Vine and Jones (2012) in their study also 
highlight the urban/rural distinction, observing of the data over a ten year period that car mileage per 
resident per year in London has gone down by 20% while for rural residents it has increased by 6%. 
A notable trend is that of fewer young people (especially males) acquiring driving licenses and corre-
spondingly declines in per capita car use being observed. Delbosc and Currie (2013) seek causes for such 
decline by examination of observed decline in nine different countries. Potential causal factors are cate-
gorized as: life stage; affordability; location and transport; driver licensing regulations; and e-
communication. While causality is explored, results are inconclusive with the authors acknowledging (as 
others do) the need for much more work, especially regarding e-communications which is seen as still 
being an emerging area for investigation (as noted also, and not only applicable to younger people, by 
van der Waard et al. (2013)). Le Vine and Jones (2012) too acknowledge the possible contribution of 
ICTs to reduced car use; and van Wee (n.d.) hypothesizes that young people being less car oriented 
could be symptomatic of a transition towards greater emphasis on ICT-based activities. 
Importantly in relation to this paper, Goodwin and Van Dender (2013, 250) observe that “the iden-
tification of a precise turning point at which the historic growth of car use slowed down, or came to a 
halt, is almost impossible…A transition can only be recognized in retrospect.” 
At this point in the paper we can observe that the challenges of attempting to understand, for some 
years, the net effect of the interaction of ICTs use and travel are in fact inter-twined with and confound-
ed by now attempting to understand puzzling new trends in car use. These are especially poorly under-
stood in relation to the effects of ICTs use and yet such use is held up as a candidate contributory factor. 
As such this might signal an important shift away from Mokhtarian’s paradox of increasing ICTs use 
(previously) occurring in the face of unabated congestion. 
Where then might we now turn to make some sense of this complexity and the accompanying com-
pelling sense that something important is happening at the moment to the shape and scale of travel de-
mand (concurrently with the digital revolution taking place)? This brings us to the paper’s hypothesis. 
This is articulated in the next section through a socio-technical conceptualization of society known as the 
Multi-Layer Perspective. 
6 Regime transition 
 
Geels (2012) suggests of transport studies that it has been dominated by the thinking of neoclassical 
economists and of engineers. This echoes the same view by Schwanen et al. (2011, 1002) who go on to 
suggest that “most research is predicated on the use of quantitative methods embedded in positivist epis-
temological frameworks.” Both observations point to a deficit of multi- and indeed inter-disciplinary 
thinking in understanding and responding to the complex socio-technical systems of both transport and 
wider society. Frank Geels has been a significant pioneer of a “heuristic framework” known as the Multi-
Layer Perspective (MLP) (Geels 2002, 2004; Geels et al. 2012) which responds to this by considering 
the “co-evolution and multi-dimensional interactions between industry, technology, markets, policy, 
culture and civil society” (Geels 2012, 471). 
 
6.1 The multi-layer perspective 
The MLP concerns three analytical levels: niches, the socio-technical regime and the socio-technical land-
scape. The landscape may be seen as the backdrop for the regime in which actors engage. It is seen to rep-
resent “the greatest degree of structuration in the sense of being beyond the control of individual actors” 
(Geels 2012, 473). Simply put, a regime encapsulates the way of the world as we know it and within 
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which the various actors engage—it is an “alignment of existing technologies, regulations, user patterns, 
infrastructures, and cultural discourses” (Geels 2012, 473). Niches are innovations that can often fail to 
gain traction but which in some cases may become the beginnings of more substantial future change as 
they strengthen in salience and enjoy growing adoption levels. Such change can be absorbed into, and 
become adaptations to, the incumbent regime or may, ultimately and over time, bring about a transition 
from one regime to another. Regimes are often established and long lasting and tend to be preserved be-
cause of such factors as path-dependency, lock-ins and vested interests. However, history reveals that 
significant regime transitions do occur at different levels – but they take time. Geels (2001) highlights 
the examples of sailing ships to steam ships (between 1840 and 1890) and horse-and-carriages to cars 
(between 1880 and 1920). 
In Geels’ examination of whether there is a transition in society towards low-carbon transport (Geels 
2012) he considers the “possible shift towards an information society" as one of three destabilizing land-
scape pressures for what he and colleagues (Geels et al. 2012) refer to as the automobility regime. It 
should be noted that he also considers the diffusion of ICTs into everyday life as a niche development. 
He goes on to suggest that “we are only in the early phases of a low-carbon transition in the transport 
domain” (Geels 2012, 479). 
 
6.2 From stability to destabilization of the automobility regime 
Through the MLP conceptualization, it is possible to articulate this paper’s hypothesis, reflecting upon 
the earlier insights that have been drawn out. 
The motor age can be recast as the automobility regime. This regime sees actors in government and 
industry especially, strongly influenced by the epistemological thinking that has bound the regime – 
characterized by the car’s contribution directly to prosperity through its industry of production, by its 
contribution to people’s right to choice and by its contribution to the connectivity between people, 
goods, services and opportunities that underpins economic and social activity. Strong effects of path de-
pendency, lock-in and vested interests serve to create inertia to any significant adaptation to the regime. 
A notable example of regime preservation was the government rescue in the US of Chrysler and General 
Motors as part of a global crisis between 2008 and 2010 also affecting European and Asian motor manu-
facturers. 
Importantly, it might be suggested that interest in how the digital age can impact upon the motor age 
has inappropriately focused upon ICTs as niches and has then sought to understand cause and effect in 
terms of how strongly niches are developing and will develop and how they will influence the regime. To 
suggest “inappropriate” is explained as follows. 
Attempting to examine the (localized) effects of specific niche ICT developments on the automobility 
regime neglects to acknowledge the more potent indirect and cumulative influence of people’s growing 
use of, and dependency upon, ICTs in their everyday lives such that it begins to influence more funda-
mentally the competencies, expectations and norms of how we communicate, make decisions, co-create 
knowledge and transact in society. Thus, in agreement with Geels, the digital age is influencing the land-
scape layer of the MLP in a way that in turn begins to destabilize the regime. Countervailing forces with-
in the regime may have been giving a strong semblance of the digital age and ICTs not having a noticea-
ble effect. This will in part have been because it has been impossible to secure convincing empirical evi-
dence as to the net effect of ICTs on travel, thus allowing the significance of the digital age from the au-
tomobility regime’s perspective (especially within transport policy and the transport industry) to be de-
nied or ignored. 
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6.3 In transition to a new regime 
My hypothesis is that we are in the midst of a regime transition for transport. While the digital age is 
characterized by a seemingly accelerated pace of change, this will be less so for the landscape layer than 
for the niches layer. Consequently it would not be unreasonable to assume that the transition has some 
way to go—perhaps decades—and will need more time before confidence grows that a new regime is 
indeed arising from transition. Yet the recent data on car use for a number of countries examined 
through the lens of “peak car” suggests the regime may indeed be showing significant signs of instability. 
It is also appropriate to note that the apparent close coupling of economic activity and traffic activity 
during the years of stability of the automobility regime (Figure 1), is now “decoupling.” Traffic intensity 
is the amount of “input” of traffic (vehicle kilometres travelled) per unit “output” of economic activity 
(GDP). Between 1980 and 1992 in Great Britain, traffic intensity increased. However, since then (to 
2008) it has reduced significantly—“GDP has increased by 56 per cent compared with a rise in road 
traffic of 23 per cent” (DfT 2010, 13). I would assert that the true coupling is between accessibility and 
economic activity, not between mobility and economic activity (see also Banister and Stead (2001)). Mo-
torization has until more recently been the dominant manifestation of accessibility. The digital age has 
been presenting—at both landscape and niche levels—powerful new opportunities for access without 
mobility. 
 
6.4 The regime of multimobilities 
How then might the emerging new regime be characterized? In very specific terms the answer is uncer-
tain. It will depend (alongside a number of other social, technological, economic, environmental and 
political driving forces) upon how the path of technology development depicted in Table 1 continues to 
unfold over time and with what consequences for society and transport. However, I propose that we are 
moving into a new regime that will include the following features: 
1. People will use forms of physical and virtual mobility much more interchangeably in order 
to access people, goods services and opportunities. 
2. These “multimobilities” will enable individuals and organizations to be flexible and respon-
sive to changing circumstances such as price signals or life events. 
3. People will much more easily adjust their mobility split between physical and virtual (and 
between motorized and non-motorized mobility). 
4. Distinctions between activity time and travel time will blur further and individuals will 
move seamlessly between physical, augmented reality and virtual encounters. 
5. Workers in the knowledge economy of the regime will have an increasingly weak link be-
tween where they live and who they work for and with. 
6. Car ownership will seem increasingly less important and car use will seem increasingly ba-
nal. Shared use of mobility resources will be favored. While use of cars (of whatever form of 
propulsion and whether or not autonomous) will continue, the car will be seen as a back-
ground technology serving a purely functional purpose. 
7 Responding to the transition 
 
The new regime (and the transition towards it) will call for government and industry actors in the 
transport sector to undergo significant epistemological adjustments. 
The hypothesis itself is contestable and only in the fullness of time will it be shown to be supportable 
or not. However, I believe it to be a plausible outlook for the future. Others may argue that preservation 
of the incumbent regime of automobility (albeit with an ongoing evolution in its makeup) is also plausi-
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ble. Taken together, this underlines that the outlook for the future is uncertain and the extent of this 
uncertainty now seems more pronounced than in recent decades. 
 
7.1 Scenario planning 
In this context the suitability of forecasting the future must be brought into question – especially so if 
this is the principal tool used to inform policymaking and key investment decisions. Forecasting has a 
tendency to conceal uncertainty (Government of Queensland, 2000) even if this is not its express inten-
tion. It is predicated on certain assumptions about key underlying drivers of future states. Parameter val-
ues of such drivers can be changed but whether or not the drivers sufficiently explain future states is a 
separate matter. 
I would concur with Goodwin and Van Dender (2013) that greater engagement with scenario plan-
ning is therefore called for to enable key actors to “rehearse the future” rather than have it thrust upon 
them and find themselves ill-equipped to engage sufficient socio-technical thinking to respond effective-
ly. Scenario planning exposes uncertainty by allowing a wider set of drivers of change to be considered 
than may be embodied in forecasting. It involves a deliberative process of engagement of a number of 
actors and commentators whereby uncertainty is embraced with the development of divergent yet plau-
sible depictions of the future. These depictions take the form of narrative scenarios of the future. While 
qualitative in nature, they can also have quantified features attributed to them if scenario planning is 
combined with modeling tools (e.g., Chatterjee and Gordon, 2006). 
Scenario planning would readily enable the plausibility of this paper’s hypothesis to be further ex-
plored with policymakers. However, scenario planning does not provide policymaking answers. It pro-
vides informed thinking and alternative perspectives on uncertainty so as to allow key policymaking 
questions to be more robustly examined. 
 
7.2 Opportunity and choice 
 
An important change of mindset is needed. Given the reduced ability to predict the future and in turn 
make transport policy decisions that support that future, there is a need instead to recognize that this 
creates an opportunity (if not a necessity) to make choices about the sort of future mobility and society 
that we wish to have, and use these to govern the policymaking and investment decisions needed to 
guide us towards that future. Governments may of course wish to avoid being (seen to be) too interven-
tionist and instead allow the market to drive change and then support that change and/or take steps to 
ameliorate any adverse effects. In this context it remains important that policymaking and investment are 
robust against a range of different futures (Lyons and Goodwin, 2014). 
 
7.3 Research 
As David Levinson concluded at the end of the World Symposium on Land Use and Transport Research 
at which this paper was presented (Delft, 24–27 June 2014) “developing new plastic, adaptable and flex-
ible designs for land use and transport systems, I believe, is the key research and policy question going 
forward.” In relation to the hypothesized transition, allied to Professor Levinson’s observation, the fol-
lowing research priorities seem appropriate in concluding this paper: 
1. To draw more strongly on the fields of science and technology studies and political science 
to both examine transport and land use policymaking processes and politics and to engage 
with these processes in ways that introduce new epistemological perspectives and an open-
ness to Levinson’s key consideration above. 
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2. To continue to apply “bottom-up” examination of specific ICT-related behaviors and their 
travel consequences since this will continue to inform how the niches layer in the MLP is 
evolving. 
3. To give greater attention to examining—both quantitatively but especially qualitatively—
people’s overall lifestyle attitudes and behaviors, including using life-course analysis tech-
niques in order to better detect and understand deeper seated change commensurate with 
the landscape and regime layers in the MLP. 
4. To examine, compare and contrast the experiences and views of digital natives and digital 
immigrants in relation to physical mobility, virtual accessibility and locational decisions for 
home, employment and leisure. 
5. To seek out and examine “case study microcosms” of emergent regime change (either 
amongst particular social groups or particular geographic locations) to better inform wider 
examination of the plausibility of different future states for wider society and in turn differ-
ent configurations of land use and transport systems. 
6. To employ scenario planning to derive different plausible manifestations of a multimobili-
ties regime and in turn apply a socio-technical lens to “imagineering” new or adapted de-
signs for our land use and transport systems that would be compatible with such manifesta-
tions. 
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